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Background
 
Studies of various countries show that those which have emphasized 
an export-led growth strategy have, in general, outperformed those which 
have followed an import substitution orientation. Accordingly, AID is 
currently focusing on export promotion as a means to stimulate economic 
growth and de'velopment. 
An effective export-ied strategy requires an integrated overall policy 
setting. In particular, trade and foreign sector policies must be related to 
labor market policies. Because labor market policy might reinforce or * 
nullify trade policy, and because labor market issues merit attention per se, 
AID has. an interest in research on how trade policies and labor market 
policies interact to affect economic development. The research reported 
here -- primarily theoretical but also including one empirical study -- helps 
fill that need. 
Papers Prepared Under the Present Study 
The scope of vrk for this project s:peci ied that three interim 
techlnical pers ,ere tCie preoared. The ciani -ireiniu s:ubmitted are: 
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"Wage Floors and Economic Development," First version,
 
October, 1954; Revised version, June, 1955;
 
"Trade Policy in an Economy with Minimum Wages and Other
 
Institutionally Determined Labor Costs," May, 1985;
 
"Export-Promotion and Labor Markets," Nag.. 1956.
 
Helpful comments were received from AID 
on the first two of these papers. 
Based on those comments and or, work in the intervening months, the 
number of technical papers has been expanded from three to five, including 
one that goes beyond the terms of the contract. They are:
 
Paper 01: "Wage Floors and Economic Development";
 
Paper #11: "Modern Sector Enlargement in Alternative
 
Dualistic Development lIidels"; 
Paper #111: "Developing the Dualistic Economy: Modern 
Sector Enlargement or Traditional Sector Enrichment?"' 
Paper *IV: "Export-Promotion and Labor Markets"; 
Paper #V: "Wage-Setting Institutions and Labor Markets," 
co-authored with Henry Wan, Jr. 
These papers appear as technical annexes to the full report and are available 
from the author or from AID. 
The balance of tIhis paper higilights the main findings and policy 
implications of the five technical papers. 
Paper 01: "Wnge Floors and Economic Development' 
The goal of economic developrrient is to raise standards of living. 
Most persons' standards of living are determined by their labor earnings. 
Thus, the attainment of full ernploylment and rising real waoes are rightly 
view.''eed as a primary mnean- ,1f itrnprovi flg i'.ing .:tani-jrdsin an ec,:,nonmy4. 
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One policy approach to raising labor earnings is indirect: encouraging 
labor-intensive economic growth. Another approach is direct action: 
establishing minimum wages, encouraging strong trade unions, or otherwise 
setting labor costs institutionally. These non-market mechanisms are 
referred to in this study as "wage floors." 
Wage floors are always sector-specific. Urban workers may be 
covered but not rural ones. Large firms may be included but not small ones. 
Trade unions are strong in certain sectors but not in others. Accordingly, 
this paper considers sector-specific wage floors. 
This paper asks what would happen if a wage floor is imposed on one 
sector of a dualistic developing economy but not the other. The answers 
are neither clear-cut nor unambiguous. Wage floors may have positive 
development effects in some circumstances, negative in others. Simple 
arguments asserting that wage floors are good (because it's better if 
workers are paid more) or bad (because wage floors introduce factor price 
distortions) are shown to be simplistic. 
Eight formal propositions are derived in this paper. They 
are: 
1. A wage floor causes unemployment. 
2. A sector-specific wage floor induces movement of 
labor out of the covered sector if the demand for labor in the 
covered sector is elastic and into the covered sector if the 
laboridemand is inelastic. 
3. For any given wage floor and for any given elasticity 
of wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the size of 
that lectors (a) A greater el as:1i of demand forabor force: 
labor in the covered sector mnay result in less unernpl :y4nent. 
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(b) A greater elasticity of demand for labor in the covered
 
sector may result in more unemployment.
 
4. For any given wage floor and for any given elasticity 
of demand for labor in the covered sector: (a) If the demand for 
labor in the covered sector is elastic, then the more elastic is 
the wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the size of 
that sector's labor force, the higher is unemploqnent: If the 
demand for labor in the covered sector is inelastic, then the 
more elastic is the wage in the noncovered sector with respect 
to the size of that sector's labor force, the lower is 
unemployment. 
5. (a) A higher wage floor may result in more 
unemployment in equilibrium. (b) A higher wage floor may 
result in less unemployment in equilibrium. 
6. (a) The total wage bill will rise if the wage floor 
moves people out of the noncovered sector and those who 
remain receive a higher wage. This happens if i) the demand for 
labor in the covered sector is inelastic and ii) the elasticity of 
the wage in the noncovered sector with respect to tile 
noncovered sector- labor force is nonzero. (b) The total wage 
bill will fall if the wage floor moves people into the 
noncovered sector and the wage falls there. This happens if i) 
the demand for labor in the covered sector is elastic and ii) the 
ela-3;tic:it .4 of the '.,,,age in tile noncovered sector with respect to 
the norlcovered sector labor force is n':'nzero. (c) The total 
wage biil ,I,illbe uncharngq.i if the wage in the noncovered 
sector does not change %,%-,hen a wage floor is- irnpo- ed in the 
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covered scctor. This happens if the elasticity of the wage in 
the noncovered sector with respect to the noncovered sector 
labor force is zero. 
7. A wage floor results in a less equal distribution of 
labor incomes. 
8. A wage floor can increase or decrease absolute 
poverty. 
The ambiguity of some of these results may come as a surprise to 
some readers. In particular, those who might be inclined on the basis of 
past reading to think that a higher wage floor necessarily results in more 
unemployment or that a more elastic demand for labor in the covered sector 
necessarily results in lower unemployment would be mistaken. 
What do these results imply for a country's wage policy? The goal of 
an economic system is to provide opportunities for improved standards of 
living for more people. The question is whether the imposition of a wage 
floor in key sectors of an economy helps attain that objective. 
Economists are largely opposed to non-market wage-setting. 
Oponents of wage floors raise the following points: 
1. A wage floor would be expected to reduce erployment 
in the covered sector, as employers in that sector move 
up their labor demand curves. 
2. 	Because of search for the better-paying jobs, a higher wage 
Would induce unemployment. 
3. 	 The econormy w1.ill be operating inefficientl inside its 
production-possibilities frontier, because some labor 
resources are Un ennployed ijnd because the marginal rates 
of transformnatio':n and' ::Eubsti tut i on are unequal. 
4. 	 Income inequality may well increase due to rising wages 
for some and failing wages and unemployment for others. 
5. 	Poverty may increase because fewer persons are worKing. 
6. 	Growth will be impeded due to lower profits and diminished 
capital formation. 
These presumed adverse effects have led the great majority of economists 
to view minimum wages, union wage-setting, and other non-market forms of 
wage determination as inappropriate mechanisms for trying to achieve 
widespread improvements in standards of living. 
Supporters of wage floors react as follows: 
1. A good society would not permit employers to pay workers 
less than a living wage. It is outrageous that workers who work 
so hard should be paid so little. The decent thing to do is to 
mandate a living wage. 
2. 	Studies have shown that the demand for labor tends to be 
inelastic. Therefore, when a wage floor is imposed, the total 
wage bill paid to labor increases. Labor is thus better off as 
a result. 
3.The economy is full of slack. If employers are forced to pay 
higher wages, they will be shocked into finding new and better 
ways of doing things. Higher wages thus benefit not only labor; 
they force manangement to be more efficient. The whole 
economry is better off. 
4. The cc'ncltuion tat a wage floor lowers emoploymenit asusrnes 
a perfectly competitive labor rarket. But in reality, labor 
mnark ets are far from11 perfect. 1:no psony is pervasiUe Inder 
mton': p.-:' n -. '.ge fI0o r, i properi i ose ca r es i-f 	 I Itl 
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grea.tr employment at the higher wage. 
5. The argument that a wage floor reduces profits and impedes 
economic growth weights the future too much and the present 
generation too little. 
How are these various points offered by the two sides to be 
evaluated? I view the arguments invoked by the opponents of wage floors as 
logical analytically and well-founded empirically. Logically, the models 
have become part of standard textbook labor economics and have withstood 
the test of time. Empirically, the evidence is strong. Downward-sioping 
labor demand curves are hardly exceptional. Workers' responsiveness to 
economic incentives in alternative sectors or locations is well-established 
empirically. So too is the existence of a labor aristocracy--workers who, 
by virtue of being employed in a favored part of the economy, receive wages 
two or three times those of their fellows employed elsewhere. And the 
development records of those economies in which market wage 
determination is the norm on the whole far surpass the records of 
economies which imposed or permit wage floors. These theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence create a strong presumption against 
institutionally imposed wage floor. 
As for the points put forth by wage floor proponents, I evaluate them 
as follows. 
I. I agree that it is outrageous that workers who work so hard 
should be paid so little. There's nothing fair about that. Out is 
it any less ou rageous Or any more fair to impose a Wage 
floor when the effect is to re'juce job opportunities and 
create unenloyment? The consequences of wage floors cannot 
be neglected. Paging a living wage to .ome whiile the mariny 
others not covered eke out whatever meagre existence they can 
doesn't make society any more decent. 
2. 	Suppose labor demand were inelastic, as proponents of wage 
floors claim. It is true that the total wage bill will rise if 
a wage floor is imposed. But, although labor as a whole may earn 
more, in the absence of distributional machardisms, those who 
lose their jobs or cannot find new ones are worse off. Only to 
the extent that redistribution actually takes place, either 
publicly (through taxes, government spending, and income
 
maintenance programs) 
or privately (through remittances, 
private transfers, etc.) is the total wage bill of labor a sound 
criterion for those concerned with the well-being of the poor. 
Anyhow, the demand for labor in a small open economy engaged 
in international trade is probably quite elastic, reflecting a 
highly elastic demand for product. In such cases, total wage 
bill paid to labor would fall if a wage floor were to be imposed, 
so the argument at the beginning of this paragraph would be 
moot..
 
3. 	The shock effect argument requires a strong belief in ineffi­
ciencies. This runs very much contrary to the view that the 
quest for maximum profits (orthodox terminology) or the 
incessant drive for capital accumulation (radical terminology) 
has led firms to be efficient 6nd ever-maximizing. To believe that 
firms can be shocked into being more efficient while 
maintaining that they are alwys maximizing is logically 
:oftradictry. 	 This cI:ntrddii:on seems not to have deterred 
f-'nmef tIle -tr-oriest believer: in the acquisitivenes-: ci 
capitalists from also being ardent spokespersons for shock 
effects and the Inefficiencies of capitalists. Illogic aside, the 
empirical evidence for shock effects is less than persuasive. 
4. The monopsony argument must be evaluated in terms of the 
mobility of labor and the consequent elasticity of supply 
of labor to the covered sector. If we envision workers in the 
uncovered sector as cunstituting a vast reserve army of the 
underemployed (not a bad assumption, I think--precisely 
the one that motivated the surplus labor models of Lewis 
and Fei and Ranis), then firms in the covered sector may have to 
raise wages very little if at all in order to attract more 
labor. In such a case, the result is only a very narrow band Within 
an exogenously-imposed wage floor would lead the monopsonist 
to increase employment. A higher wage resulting in less 
employment is far more likely. 
5. The intertemporal issue is one of the potential for economic 
growth and improvements in labor well-being through saving, 
investment, and capital-formation. Steady-state growth 
models weigh only the future. I agree with critics who say those 
models give too little weight to the present. But it is just as 
wrong to consider only the present as it is t.o consider only 
the future. Rates of time preference must be weighed against the 
gains from investment and growth. To give no weight to capital 
and profits and thereby to ignore growAth effects and future 
generations of workers is wrong too. 
In slm.. I ar per-uaded more by the argumnents agai n t age f 1oors 
than I an by t,ie counter -riutmnent.-;in their fa.''or Corn:equently, in the 
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absence of evidence to the contrary in a particular context, I am inclined to 
regard market wage determination as the preferred labor market regime. 
In Paper OV and elsewhere, (Fields, 1954, 1985), I have made the case 
that those East Asian economies that rely largely on market wage 
determination have done very well, not only in terms of higher GNP growth 
but also in terms of attainment of full employment, rapidly rising real 
wages, low to moderate levels of income inequality, and failing absolute 
poverty. For those very same economies, trade was the engine of growth and 
of improved standards of living. This creates further presumptive evidence 
in favor of market wage determination. 
No one questions the desirability of higher standards of living for 
workers in developing economies. The sooner, the better. But pushing 
wages up prematurely through artificially-set wage floors is probably not 
the best way to go about it and may well be counterproductive. Policies 
aimed at enhancing a country's ability to produce profitably and efficiently 
for the work market hold out more promise. 
Paper 011: "Modern Sector Enlargement in Alternative 
Dualistic Development Models" 
Paper #1 took the country's trade policy as given and asked what 
what would happen if a wage floor is imposed on one sector of ci dualistic 
developing economy but not the other. Papers 011 and #111, by contrast, take 
the evage floor as given and investigate the country's trade policy. 
In the context of a dual istic developing econormy, the key dlstinction 
is between a high income "modern" sector and a low income "traditional" 
sector. The essence OT. econornic development is the gradual up qrading of 
tra,-ii . ini -ec:tc'ir 't'r.er, through: (a) 'modern e:c tor enl ar-ernrent.,* 
whereby the high income sector expands in size to employ a larger number 
of workers, and/or (b)'traditional sector enrichment," whereby those who 
remain in the traditional sector enjoy gains in income through higher 
earnings or self-employment income. Itis assumed here that the high wage 
sector is the export sector and the low wage sector is the domestic goods 
sector. This assumption is appropriate to many economies which export 
manufactured gouds or mineral products. 
Paper 411 examines the effects of enlarging a country's modern 
export sector, for example, because the country is successful in attracting 
foreign firms to produce for export within its borders or because an aid 
agency makes money available to the country to develop its export 
industries. In actuality, resources must typically be expended in order to 
attract resources from abroad; for instance, tax concessions may have to be 
made to attract investment, infrastructure may have to be provided at 
public expense, and the like. Out to abstract from these costs and highlight 
the point of the argumentthe analysis here proceeds on the assumption that 
funds for expanding the modern export sector are made available to the 
country costlessly. The decision facing the country is whether or not to 
accept a costless injection of resources. 
We might be inclined to think that a costless injection of resources 
would be an unambiguously good thing, reasoning along the following lines. 
The new resources would be expected to shift the country's production­
possibilitie-. frontier OUtw;1Yard, enablirg nore goods and serv.:ices to be 
produced. To the extent that labor is used inthe productive process, 
employment is enhanced. Wages may.well be bid up by the need for a larger 
work force. af fri-i ring the Ii Iir1t unit 4for irprO ,, tandard. o;: 1 4I 
am:ing 11I-- h-ead r:in Idthe inc:rne distribUti y "eIlr  v Ani tn' tie 
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improved, both in terms of relative inequality and in terms of absolute 
poverty. On the whole, then, a widespread presumption is that the benefits 
of expanding a country's modern export sector may well be substantial. 
Paper #11 -- "Modern Sector Enlargement in Alternative Dualistic 
Development Models" -- shows that the answer is not so simple. Taking 
account of induced effects, modern sector enlargement may, on balance, be 
positive or negative. This is aside from opportunity cost considerations, 
i.e., the possibility that the funds might have been better used elsewhere in 
the economy. 
In the best of circumstances, modern sector enlargement is clearly 
beneficial. This is the case when those who are newly-employed in the 
high-wage modern sector are drawn from employment in the low-income 
traditional sector or from unemployment. When this happens, the workers 
themselves are better off; so too is the economy. One such case was 
analyzed in a previous paper of mine (Fields, 1979) -- the case of zero 
unemployment, when all of the newly-employed in the high wage sector are 
drawn from low-wage agricultural emoloyment. 
In other circumstances, though, the effects are less cleariy 
beneficial. The central issue is whether the creation of additional high 
wage jobs is itself a cause of additional unemployment. This may well be 
the case in actual countries' experiences. In recognition of this, models 
such as that of Harris and Todaro (1970) specify that high wage jobs are 
filled only b!4 individuals who search while unemployed. 
A key result of the HT class-of models is that for any giver 
differential in wages between high wage and low wage jobs, the more high 
wage jobs there are, the more unemployment there .,Hill be. However, the 
age differential rn y itself chanige, depending on :it)h'. r-epn -ii..ie 'P,ag'.s 
in the Ggricultural sector are to changes in the size of that sector's labor 
force and (11) whether the net eflect or modern sector enlargement is for 
workers to move into or move out of the agricultural sector. It follows that 
a complete analysis of the effects of modern sector job creation must 
consider not only the net creation of new jobs but also adjustments in the 
wage structure and in the intersectoral allocation of the labor force among 
search strategies. 
The following results are obtained in Paper #11: 
1. Modern sector enlargement does not necessarily raise GNP; 
GNP may remain unchanged. 
2. Although modern sector enlargement increases employment 
in the high wage sector, it may also increase unemployment. 
3. Modern sector enlargement may raise or lower relative 
income inequality, depending upon the model. 
4. Modern sector enlargement may lower absolute poverty or to 
affect its components ambiguously, depending upon the model. 
These results imply that the labor market and income distribution 
consequences of modern sector enlargement are not robust to model 
specification. The consequences are very different depending on whether 
the economy in question is a zero-unemployment economy or a Harris­
Todaro-type economy. 
These findings have policy ramifications. Suppose a developing 
country can enlarge its modern sector costlessly -- say, by accepting 
foreign all offered for- that purpose I-or %wel corni ng in rnultinational 
corporations who are. willing to invest in the modern sector. Even if it can 
do so..o Then again., it rna!_ not.d el:'oprnent ia ibe harripered. ',",hiich of these 
SS as e eF' en ds on t he r :uni i -;1abor m arlI-k i ng of the r l rket, d i n 
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particular, on how much additional unemployment is generated by modern 
sector enlargement. 
Some policy interventions are suggested by these findings. One 
variable is whether an economy faces a constant marginal product of labor 
in agriculture or a falling one. This may be influenced by development 
planners and policymakers to the extent that they can alter patterns of land 
ownership and land tenure, agricultural credit, fertilizer, and other inputs. 
Another variable is the labor market institutions *hemselves. If job 
search had less payoff, there would be less search unemployment. In models 
such as that of Harris and Todaro, migration in search of employment 
confers only social losses (viz., loss of agricultural output) with no 
corresponding social gain. In these circumstances, the case is strong for 
making such migration less rewarding. One way of doing this might be to 
enhance on-the-job search, for instance, by establishing more 
comprehensive employment exchanges to which employed workers have 
access.
 
Paper #111: -Developing the Dualistic Economy: Modern 
Sector Enlargement or Traditional Sector Enrichment?-
Countries are sometirmes offered resources which may be used to 
promote economic development in whate,..er way is deemed most desirable. 
In the context of a dualistic economy, this means that the resources might 
be deployed for use in developing the modern sector or in developing the 
traditional sector. It is up ti:I the development authorities to decide how to 
allocate these resources between sectors. 
TI,e poi i % ria h e u nder i n t jq;t in ni Pap er I I I, a.:; in Fa p .r 0II, 
is the counr't I'"; h ic-e i f t.rad e pI:-ii:cy_ Al e n::i d er the c: a e:: iI'1, 
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a dualistic developing economy consisting of a high-wage export sector 
('modern") and a low-wage agricultural sector ("traditional"). The issue 
examined here is what trade policy should be chosen. The specific way in 
which the choice of a trade policy is implemented is the decision whethor to 
allocate additional development resources to the economy's modern sector 
in order to expand production and empioyment there (a process termed 
"modern sector enlargement") or to allocate those resources for enhancing 
roductivity in domestic agriculture (a process termed "traditional sector 
enrichment"). 
The practical policy context is immediate. Many developing countries 
have money available for development purposes. The source of these funds 
may be the natiunal treasury, a foreign donor, or a multinationdl 
corporation. Although at times, the development fund is made available only 
for particular purposes -- for example, when a multinational corporation 
invests in a country for modern sector export expansion, as analyzed in 
Paper #11 -- at other times, the development fund is unrestricted and may 
be spent on whatever sector or activity is deemed most useful. Paper #111 
considers the effects of receiving a development fund for use in expanding 
production and employment in either of two sectors of a dualistic economy. 
Different theoretical perspectives on dualistic development suggest 
different answers. Those coming from th? tradition of Lewis, Fei and Ranis, 
Jorgenson, and others might tend to regard the modern sector as the leading 
sector and trade as the engine of growth. The presumption imong these 
observers is that thF. .est use of additional development resources is to 
stimulate the mojern sector. Others would tend to argue just the opposite. 
Some, -Suchas Schultz, are in:Ilined to believe that traditi onal agric ulture 
has been .-tarved for resIouIlrces and that an influ:." :f develi:pirent fund.:; to 
that sector would have a higher marginul product than in the modern sector. 
Furthermore, in light of the migration models of Harris and Todaro, 
Harberger, and followers, there is good reason to be wary of expanding jobs 
in the relatively high-wage urban economy, because in these models, such an 
expansion induces an influx of job-seekers, in all likelihood aggravating 
unemployment. 
These different perspectives about how best to allocate development 
resources reflect different maintained assumptions (usually implicit) about 
conditions in product and labor markets. I would characterize them thus. 
Those who favor allocating development resources to the modern 
sector tend to presume that economic growth is best achieved by shifting 
the locus of economic activity toward modern sector activities. The case 
for development of the modern export sector hinges on a number of 
assumptions: that the marginal product of additional resources allocated to 
the modern sector is high; the labor required for expanding production is 
forthcoming; the additional products can be sold profitably in the world 
market; and relatively little output is foregone by rechanneling resources 
from the traditional to the modern sector. 
The case favoring the allocation of additional resources to the 
traditional sector reflects different assumptions, among them: that the 
marginal product of additional resources is higher in traditional agriculture 
than in the modern sector; that an expansion of employment in the modern 
export sector- may pullso much labor out of traditional agriculture that 
foregq onrie output is high, and thal an excess of job-seekers over job 
opportunities will create additional unemployment. 
The results r'f the mnodel formulated in Paper #111 are as follows: 
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1.The costless availability of a development fund may 
not bring about development. The errects may be adverse. 
2. If the development fund is offered to the country 
without restriction (by AID, say), the choice whether to use the 
fund to stimulate growth of the modern sector, growth of the 
traditional sector, or neither depends on: a) The amount of 
modern sector enlargement that can take place from the given 
development fund, b) The effects of modern sector enlargement 
if the fund is used for that purpose, c) The amount, of 
traditional sector enrichment that can take place from the 
given development fund, and d) The effects of traditional sector 
enricnment if funds are used for that purpose. 
3. The choice of a trade policy, as represented by the 
decision of how to allocate development funds between 
sectors, is extremely sensitive to the specification of labor 
market conditions. In this way, the choice of a trade policy 
should be conditioned fundamentally by the labor market 
conditions prevalent in a country. 
The practical significance of these results is the following. It is 
most efficacious to use additional development resources to expand modern 
sector exports and employment when the marginal product of capital in the 
modern sector is high and the amount of induced unemployment is low. In 
other circumstances -- namely, when the marginal product of capitul is 
higher in the traditional sector than in the modern sector and when search 
unempl oyr-nent is w idespread-- all ocati ng the deve1 loprnent for purp:e;s of 
traditional sector enric:hmnent 'oul d be better. The presence o:'f rninimuIri 
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wages or other institutionally determined labor costs certainly must be 
taken account of in any decision of how best to utilize development funds; 
but whether export-led growth is precluded or not depends on the precise 
product market and labor market circumstances prevailing. No general 
conclusion about the relative merits of export-led growth versus 
domestically-oriented growth can be reached without further specifying the 
particular circumstances in a given economy. 
Paper 1V: "Export Promotion and Labor Markets" 
This paper analyzes interactions between trade policy and labor 
market policy. This differs from the preceding papers, in which one policy 
or the other was assumed to have been pre-set. 
The aspect of trade policy considered here is export promotion 
Because the term "export promotion" is used in various ways by various 
authors, I should be clear about what I mean by it here. In this paper, I 
follow the lead of Ranis (1981) and define export promotion as the active 
expenditure of resources in order to facilitate exports. An example of 
export promotion would be the construction of a harbor at public expense. 
This contrasts with "export substitution," a less interventionist strategy, 
which entails removing tariffs and quotas on imported goods., eliminating 
export licensing, lifting capital subsidies, revaluing an overvalued exchange 
rate, or otherwise "getting the prices right." 
One question is why export promotion is required at all. Take the 
example of a harbor. If indeed exporting iq a profitable activity, why is the 
h;mrbor not built at private expense? A strong possibility of market 
imperfection arises, narnely, that private sector firms may be unable to 
borro uf'.i i::i en t f.ind---- to carr4 out t he ep:irt-prorno t n pro je ct on the ir 
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own. Capital market imperfections are an important reason for export­
promotion activities to be undertaken by the public sector. 
Export promotion (e.g., public construction of a harbor) creates an 
externality: export firms receive a publicly-provided input for which they do 
not pay. This is in the nature of a quasi-fixed cost: once export promotion 
has been decided upon, society must pay for the harbor, but these costs can 
be avoided if the harbor is not built. 
Our anaigsis of export promotion must recognize the divergence 
between social and private costs and benefits. Firms decide whether to 
export and how much to export on the basis of their private calculations. 
The social calculations differ. One reason for the divergence is that a 
social cost is incurred by creating the facilities by which exporting can 
take place. This cost is an external benefit to the export firm. Another 
reason for the divergence between private and social returns is that the 
export sector may face a wage floor and therelore be obliged to pay 
relatively high wages. In this case, unemployment may result. This is 
another external social cost which does not enter into the calculations of 
the export firm but should nonetheless be taken account of in the social 
decision regarding export promotion. 
Consider, then, the following "typical" situation: decisions about 
exporting are decentralized among private firms, the public sector provides 
an input needed for exporting, capital markets are imperfect., and wages are 
artificialiy high in the export sector. Because these ' onditions deviate so 
markedly from those assurned in standard international trade models, we 
cannot use the theorems of trade theory to justify free trade as the best 
policy. Instead, when private and social profitability of ep:porting diverge, 
govenment in'iolvemrent m:ay be called for. But thi : i nvolverent mu-t be 
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considered with great care. When the social costs of exporting exceed the 
private costs, as is often the case, exporting may be privatelyprofitable bul 
socially unprofitable. Even though the export firm might earn a profit from 
exporting and the workers employed in that firm might earn higher wages 
than they would have otherwise, and maybe even the workers who are left 
behind in the domestic goods sector earn higher wages because of the 
removal of some workers into the industrial sector, it may nonetheless be 
that the combined gain for firms and workers will not be large enough to 
-meet the cost of constructing the harbor in the first place. 
Whether the export promotion activity is socially profitable or not 
depends on the particular parameter values and on the labor market regime 
in the country. The country's labor market policy alters all variables. 
Suppose that wages in the export sector are pushed up above the market­
clearing level. Then, for any given output level, the cost of production 
increases. As a result, less output is produced, less revenue is'generated, 
less employment is gained in the export sector, and the social profitability 
of export promotion decreases. Consequently, an export-promotion activity 
that might have been socially profitable if the wage in the export sector 
were market-determined may become socially unprofitable if the wage in 
the export sector is raised above market levels. 
The model developed in Paper O1V demonstrates rigorously the 
possibility that an export promotion activity that may be socially desirable 
with market-clearing wages may be rendered sociallyj undesirijble when 
wages are set above market-clearing levels. Inparticil ar: 
1. Itisposible (but not necessary) that a policy of 
funds to 
e:x:port.-: by subsi dizing the pri'..ate sector) produces hiher iNF 
e:x port- prono t i on (i.e., s pen di nig pub lir r  proimco t e 
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than an inward-looking trade strategy when wages in the 
export sector are market-determined. 
2. However, the ranking may be reversed when wages in 
the export sector are set institutionally above market levels: 
the Inward-looking trade strategy may produce higher GNP than 
an export-oriented trade strategy inder non-market­
determined wages. 
3. Therefore, whether an export-oriented trade strategy 
raises GNP or lowers it depenp(s in part on the labor market 
regime within which trade po'icy is chosen 
It is important to note that while the labor market regime mighLt cause a 
reversal of trade policy, it does not necessarily do so. Nonetheless, trade 
policy and labor market policy interact in ways that are not always 
appreciated.
 
Certain policy implications are suggested by these results. The 
practical policy question is which policy takes primacy: trade policy or 
labor market policy. Suppose the country's labor market regime is 
immutable. This may be because of a politically-based decision to 
encourage strong trade unions or because of the belief that minimum wages 
are good in and of themselves. In either case, export promotion may not be 
warranted, because the volume of exports is too low to justify the requisite 
costs. But in the alternate situation where the country's labor market 
regime is a genuine policy instrument, labor market policy and trade policy 
should be formulated jointly. The two policies operate synergistically: the 
optimal trade policy choice depends on the choice of labor market policy and 
vice versa. 
22 
'hese results raise an important note of caution for policy-makers. 
The advice now being so freely-dispensed -- "develop viiu exports" -- may be 
quite suitable for a country with market-determined wages, quite 
disastrous otherwise. The reason for this is that the country's ability to 
export and the social gains from exporting may be adversely affected by 
higher-than-market-clearing wages. This is not an endorsement of wage 
repression: it is an argument for allowing wages to be pulled up by 
increased competition for workers engendered by export-led growth rather 
than forcing them to be pushed up by non-market forces. 
The Jamaicas, Mexicos, and Indonesias of the Third World are being 
advisej to develop through export-led growth. Because wages in their 
export sectors are two or three times higher than market-clearing levels, 
these countries start out at an enormous disadvantage in trying to compete 
successfully in world markets with the U.S., the European Economic 
Community, Japan, and the East Asian NICs. Can they and those who advise 
them really expect export-oriented trade policies to improve standards of 
living under such circumstances? If non-market wage determination is 
decided upon first as a matter of public policy, an export-led trade and 
industrialization policyj may thereby be precluded. Under such conditions, 
whatever development policy package is adopted, production for export 
ought not to be part of it. 
Not to be able to export profitably is bad. To export unprofitably is 
worse. 
PaperSV: "Wage-Setting Institutions and Economic Growth" 
(co-authored with Henry Wan, Jr.) 
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The scope of work for this project specified a number of theoretical 
StUdies to be done. These studies have been described above. 
However, in applied economics, theoretical models are not purely 
deductive. They are rooted fundamentally in the reality of labor market 
conditions in different parts of the world. 
Different wage policies are pursued in various regions of the 
developing world. The single most important issue is whether a country 
relies primarily on market wage determination or institutional wage 
determination. Thus, in the course of this research, an investigation was 
made into wage-setting institutions in various developing countries. In 
Paper #V, the wage-setting institutions in the economies of Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are compared with those in Costa Rica, 
Panama, and Jamaica. 
In most of the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and 
South Asia, wages in key sectors are not determined by supply and demand 
but rather by any or all of a number of non-market forces. These non­
market forces often have potent influences in key sectors of those 
countries' labor markets. Minimum wage laws are common in many 
developing countries, at least in certain major sectors (e.g., large 
factories). When these laws are enforced, wages may be very much higher in 
the affected sectors than they might otherwise have been in the absence of 
minimum wage laws. Labor unions often are very strong, and are able to use 
their strength at the bargaining table to secure above-market wages for 
their members. Paypo:lAicy vith respect Putbi -: sector rnpjo~yees 
frequently results in higher wages being paid to government workers than to 
comparable workers in the private sector. "Jultirational corport.irons 
t0mne t i rries are r: ouira ge d t o pai ge .: I1 I lehigh :: - r t those 
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corporations be expelled from the country if they do not. Finally., labor 
codes and protective labor legislation may add substantially to the costs 
employers must pay when they hire workers. For these reasons, models 
with wage dualism, unemployment, and other such features are often used to 
model these countries' labor markets. 
The newly-industrializing countries of East Asia are different. 
Wages and other labor costs have not been inflated artificially there. 
Economic development in those economies has depended on low labor costs. 
Policy-makers in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan realized that if 
they were to gain and then maintain trade positions in world markets, the 
basis for doing so would be low price, which implied in turn the reed for 
low wages. Their wage policies consequently prevented wages fr Gm 
exceeding market levels, as was true in other parts of the world. For the 
most part, wage levels in the East Asian NIC's were left to be determined by 
supply and demand. 
Market wage determination, prevalent in the economies of East Asia 
during most of their recent histories, has had several fundamentally 
important implications for the success of export-led growth in their 
economies. For one thing, market wage determination helped those 
countries avoid economic inefficiencies and misallocations of labor which 
might have arisen frorm distortions in wages. Market wage deterrmination 
also naturally l.d employers to utilize the available labor force to the 
fullest extent pos-sible, enabling those econloriCS to pursue their inherent 
:Iorparati,,e advantaiges aind pt-L-IJ:e ig1ods inftenIsi',/e in labor. Another 
benefit of market wage determination is that it preet.:;substitution of 
ic:api tal in place oif labor in the pro duction proces_; which., if it takes place, 
rl rpl oI ri e I e eff e ti.; v"ee ne n t. ' et ano t h e r p Ibss t hat rnrlI::et age 
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determination diminishes the expected-income incentive in rui al-urban 
migration; as shown in Fields (1984), the wage differential between 
manufacturing and agriculture is quite narrow in East Asia, much in
 
contrast to most Latin American countries. Finally, market wage
 
determination avoids unnecessarily high costs of production that might
 
hamper a country's ability to sell their products profitability in world 
markets. 
Oesides the direct effects described above, market wage 
determination also has effects on other factors often emphasized in the 
development literature. For instance, price stability requires absence of 
wage push. Then too, attraction of foreign investment requires reasonable 
labor cost and industrial peace. Wage institutions are one element among 
many determinants of development performance, but they merit more 
attention than is usually given them. 
Although the NIC's have generally relied on market wage­
determination, they have done so with very different amounts of government 
involvement. The governments of Singapore and Korea have been the most 
interventionist, applying government power to restrict wage growth. The 
Hong Kong government has adopted perhaps the most laissez faire set of 
labor market policies of any government in the world. Taiwan is closer in 
that respect to Hong Kong than to Korea or Singapore. The difference, 
interestingly, is not between the larger economies and the city-states but 
between the overall amount of central direction in their respecti ve 
econornies. But when confronlted by lbor unrest and entrepreneurial flight 
respectively, the governments of Korea and Singapore were forced to bow to 
eco:'nornic inevi tabili ty. Thu's, when wi de departUres fron the narket '.'age 
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rate threatened to slow the engine of growth, they reversed their courses 
and turned again to market forces. 
Whereas avoidance of premature wage Increases dominated wage 
policy in th, NIC's in the past, conscious efforts are now being made to push 
wages up somewhat. Taiwan introduced a new labor law a year ago and 
Korea is actively considering introducing a minimum wage. Whether market 
determination will prevail in the East Asian NIC's in the future as it has in 
the past remains to be seen. It appears likely that it will. The NICs' 
governments are well-aware that market wage determination has served 
them very well up to now. This wareness is perhaps the strongest reason 
to predict that they will not seriously distort wages in the future. 
The fact is that the East Asian NIC's have done better than economies 
elsewhere. The NIC's have attained full employment, pronounced 
improvements in real wages, and rapidly rising prosperity. They have done 
so while letting supply and demand dominate their labor markets. 
The following conclusions may be drawn from the record: 
1. A market-determined wage rate, combined with an 
export-oriented economy, can absorb large numbers of workers 
in a few short years. By contrast, high minimum wages, 
militant unionism, or overzealous social legislation appear to 
impede growth of employment and output and hence do little to 
help country-wide poverty. 
2. Wage repression is urnecessary and undesirable at 
this stage -- unnecessary because, as in the experience of Hong 
Kong, full employment can be attained quickly; undesirable 
ber:ause, as. in the experien:e of Korea, waqe repress iion 
generate, wor:ers' re-:entrnenlt and enidaner: ir:du.-f.rial peace. 
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3. What justifies initial wage restraint is the rapid rise 
in labor earnings that accompanied the East Asian NICs' 
economic growth. Real earnings 'grew much more rapidly in 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan than in Latin America, 
both because full employment was attained and because real 
wages per hour are sharply higher. As a result, the workers in 
the East Asian NIC's live very much better than they did a 
decade or two ago. 
it bears mention that while the East Asian economies did not permit 
wages to be set well above market-clearing levels, it is also true that for 
the most part they did not hold wages artificially below market-clearing 
levels either. But in Singapore in the 1970's and apparently in Korea more 
recently, wage repression was practiced. 
The successes of market wage determination point to a direction that 
other countries might pursue to advantage. But this call-should not be 
misinterpreted. The goal of any economic system is to provide higher 
standards of living for people. Living standards should not be sacrificed to 
economic growth per se. Nor is laissez faire capitalism necessarily the 
best form of economic organization. When supply and demand have 
determined wages and when economic growth consistent with comparative 
advantage has taken place, outcomes have been favorable at both the macro 
and the micro levels. Standards of living have jumped as a result. 
More cirnpirical work on other countries remains to be done. 
